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INTRODUCTION

Throughout American history, farmers have played a vital role
in American society and the construction of its economy. This
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fundamental fact remains true today. In 2013, the meat and poultry
packing industry in the United States employed more than 482,100
workers (with combined salaries of more than $19 billion) and
produced approximately 93.5 billion pounds of meat for consumers
around the world.1 Sales of this meat totaled $198 billion, and, when
taking into account the meat and poultry packing industry’s
suppliers, distributors, retailers, and ancillary industries, “[t]he meat
and poultry industry’s economic ripple effect generates $864.2
billion annually to the U.S. economy, or roughly 6% of the entire
[gross domestic product].”2 Moreover, the contributions of
American livestock and poultry farmers and the meat packing
industry in the United States extend far beyond mere economic
considerations. The estimated global population has increased from
approximately 3.5 billion in 1967 to approximately 7.5 billion today.3
This population increase is expected to continue exponentially, with
the global population expected to reach 8.5 billion people by the
year 2030 and 11.2 billion people by the year 2100.4 Although
America’s livestock and poultry farmers and the meat packing
industry have achieved amazing production efficiencies, even
greater advances in efficiency and production will be necessary in
order to continue to feed the ever-increasing global population.
However, despite the tremendous innovations and successes of
American agriculture over the past several years, farmers are now
under siege on multiple fronts. In order to raise funds to advance
their political agenda, environmental and animal rights activists use
isolated incidents and edited videos to falsely accuse livestock and
poultry farmers of destroying the quality of air and water and of
abusing animals. These attacks have led to unprecedented increases
in the scope of governmental regulation of agricultural practices,
including, perhaps most prominently in the eyes of the general
public, various types of environmental regulations.5
1. The United States Meat Industry at a Glance, N. AM. MEAT INST.,
https://www.meatinstitute.org/index.php?ht=d/sp/i/47465/pid/47465
(last
visited Feb. 25, 2017).
2. Id.
3. See Human Population: Population Growth, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU,
http://www.prb.org/Publications/Lesson-Plans/HumanPopulation
/PopulationGrowth.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
4. World Population Projected to Reach 9.7 Billion by 2050, U.N. DEP’T OF ECON.
AND SOC. AFF. (July 29, 2015), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/news
/population/2015-report.html.
5. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 (2012); Clean Air Act, 42
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This article focuses on one particular piece of federal legislation
and its accompanying regulations that may be less prominent in the
public realm but have been a significant part of the meat packing
industry for nearly one hundred years: the Packers and Stockyards
Act (the “PSA” or the “Act”).6 The PSA was enacted on August 15,
1921,7 and, as discussed in greater detail throughout this article,
exists “to insure effective competition and integrity in livestock,
meat, and poultry markets.”8 This purpose is currently pursued by
the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration
(“GIPSA”), which assumed responsibility for administering the Act
in 1994.9 In 2010, however, GIPSA proposed various rules and
regulations10 that quickly became the source of great controversy
within the meat and poultry industry.11 While many of these rules
did not ultimately take effect at the time,12 GIPSA recently revived
several of these regulations through new interim and proposed
regulations.13
More specifically, this article analyzes some of GIPSA’s more
controversial rules in light of the PSA as it has existed, been altered,
and been interpreted over the past ninety-five years. Part II provides
the necessary background for this analysis, discussing both the
U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2012).
6. 7 U.S.C. §§ 181–229 (2012).
7. Id. § 181.
8. The Packers and Stockyards Act: An Overview, THE NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR.,
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/overview/packers-and-stockyards/ (last visited
Feb. 25, 2017).
9. Christopher R. Kelley, An Overview of the Packers and Stockyards Act, 2003 ARK.
L. NOTES 35, 36 (2003). Prior to 1994, the Act was administered by the Packers and
Stockyards Administration. Id.
10. See Implementation of Regulations Required Under Title XI of the Food,
Conservation and Energy Act of 2008; Conduct in Violation of the Act, 75 Fed. Reg.
35,338 (June 22, 2010) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 201).
11. See Shauna R. Hermel, Alert: GIPSA Livestock Marketing Rule, ANGUS BEEF
BULL. (July 20, 2010), http://www.angusbeefbulletin.com/extra/2010/07jul10
/0710mk_gipsa_rule.html (summarizing the views of industry organizations with
regard to the proposed 2010 GIPSA rules).
12. See generally JOEL L. GREENE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41673, USDA’S
“GIPSA RULE” ON LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY MARKETING PRACTICES (2015) (discussing
the rulemaking history of GIPSA’s proposed rules and how subsequent GIPSA riders
prevented enactment of certain aspects of those proposed rules).
13. Scope of Sections 202(a) and (b) of the Packers and Stockyards Act, 81
Fed. Reg. 92,566 (Dec. 20, 2016) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 201); Unfair Practices
and Undue Preferences in Violation of the Packers and Stockyards Act, 81 Fed. Reg.
92,703 (Dec. 20, 2016) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 201).
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history of the PSA as originally enacted and portions of the Act that
are invoked on a regular basis.14 Part III then focuses on a more
recent piece of legislation—the 2008 Farm Bill—and GIPSA’s
attempt to exercise its rulemaking authority under that legislation to
dramatically change the landscape of the PSA.15 Next, Part IV argues
that GIPSA goes too far in these attempts, thereby effectively
rewriting the PSA to increase the scope of its regulatory authority.16
In particular, this article asserts that GIPSA’s efforts are inconsistent
with the purpose of the PSA, both as originally enacted and as
interpreted over the past ninety-five years.17
II. THE PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ACT: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The PSA was originally enacted “[t]o regulate interstate and
foreign commerce in livestock, live-stock products, dairy products,
poultry, poultry products, and eggs, and for other purposes.”18
Section A of this Part discusses that purpose in light of the meat
packing industry at the time the PSA was enacted.19 Section B then
discusses the general statutory structure of the PSA.20
A.

The Historical Backdrop of the PSA

The early-1900s meat packing industry was markedly different
than the industry today. At that time, the chain of commerce in the
industry was connected through various forms of infrastructure,
including the railroads; stock cars and refrigerator cars; and freight
depots and stockyards, where livestock was ultimately sold to
packers.21 Individual producers, who might have raised livestock in
any part of the country (although most frequently in the ranges in
the western United States), were dependent upon this
infrastructure.22 For example, a farmer or rancher may load his
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Parts III–IV.
18. Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, ch. 64, 42 Stat. 159.
19. See infra Section I.A.
20. See infra Section I.B.
21. FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON THE
MEAT-PACKING INDUSTRY 25, 40 (1919).
22. See Louise Carroll Wade, Meatpacking, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHI.,
http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/804.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2017).
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animals on a freight car bound for distant stockyards or processing
plants without ever directly dealing with or visiting those facilities. As
a result of these market dynamics and the sheer distance separating
most farmers and packing plants, the integrity and propriety of this
chain of commerce was a great concern.23 Additionally, the
sanitation and working conditions of packing plants at the turn of
the twentieth century24 became a great concern that led to
legislation.25
Suspecting antitrust law violations within the meat packing
industry, in 1917, the President of the United States directed the
Federal Trade Commission to investigate that industry’s practices.26
Over the next year, such an investigation took place, resulting in a
six-volume report that confirmed the existence of “monopolies,
controls, trusts, combinations, conspiracies, or restraints of trade out
of harmony with the law and the public interest” in the meat packing
industry.27 Specifically, the report found the meat packing industry
was dominated by five companies: Swift & Company, Armour &
Company, Morris & Company, Cudahy Packing Company, and
Wilson & Company.28 Discussing these five companies, the report
stated:
As we have followed these five great corporations through
their amazing and devious ramifications—followed them
through important branches of industry, of commerce, and
of finance—we have been able to trace back to its source
the great power which has made possible their growth. We
have found that it is not so much the means of production
and preparation, nor the sheer momentum of great wealth,
but the advantage which is obtained through a
monopolistic control of the market places and means of
transportation and distribution.29
Specifically, the Federal Trade Commission found that Swift,
Armour, Morris, Cudahy, and Wilson used their ownership of
packing houses, control over channels of distribution (including
stockyards, private car lines, cold storage plants, and branch houses),

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21, at 25, 40.
See generally UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906).
See, e.g., Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1907).
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21, at 23.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 24.
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and control over distributive machinery to “[m]anipulate live-stock
markets; [r]estrict interstate and international supplies of foods;
[c]ontrol the prices of dressed meats and other foods; [d]efraud
both the producers of food and consumers; [c]rush effective
competition; [s]ecure special privileges from railroads, stockyard
companies, and municipalities; and [p]rofiteer.”30
Although Congress rejected the Federal Trade Commission’s
suggestion that the federal government take ownership of stockyards
and other related facilities,31 Congress did respond to the findings
in the report by enacting the PSA.32
The legislative history of the PSA suggests varying accounts of
the Act’s original, basic purpose, and two fields of thought have
emerged as to what that purpose is.33 The first, which has been
recognized by the United States Supreme Court for the entire history
of the Act, supports the assertion that “the PSA is one of several
antitrust statutes intended to protect competition in order to protect
consumers from high prices.”34 This view is bolstered by the notion
that the PSA has common heritage and shares intellectual, political,
and legal history with the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Federal
Trade Commission Act—other antitrust statutes that focus on
promoting market efficiency and consumer welfare.35

30. Id.
31. Kelley, supra note 9, at 37.
32. Id.
33. See John D. Shively & Jeffrey S. Roberts, Competition Under the Packers and
Stockyards Act: What Now?, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 419, 431 (2010).
34. Id. (citing Wheeler v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 591 F.3d 355, 370 (5th Cir.
2009) (en banc) (Jones, C.J., concurring)).
35. Id. at 431–32. The legislative history bolstering this view was thoroughly
discussed by the concurring opinion filed in Wheeler. 591 F.3d at 369–70. Such
history includes the report of the House Committee on Agriculture (H.R. Rep. No.
67-77, at 2–10 (1921)), which focused on the Supreme Court’s competition
jurisprudence developed with regard to the Interstate Commerce Act and the
Federal Trade Commission Act when discussing the PSA’s meatpacker provisions;
the House Committee on Agriculture’s May 2, 1921, Hearing on Meat Packers,
which discussed the prevention of packers from “combination, apportionment of
territory and of markets, as well as the oppression of competitors” as the call for the
PSA; and statements by supporters of the PSA (Committee on Agriculture of the House
of Representatives, Hearing on Meat Packers, May 2, 1921, at 54 (statement of National
League of Women Voters); H.R. Rep. No. 85-1048, at 1 (1957)), which asserted that
the Act would ultimately aid farmers and growers and reduce the price of food for
consumers.
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The second field of thought, which is advanced by GIPSA, is far
broader and asserts that “the PSA is a market regulatory statute
intended to protect producers from low prices, and it might well be
more restrictive than antitrust statutes, which ‘protect[] . . .
competition, not competitors.’”36 This view is bolstered by “everincreasing concentration and vertical integration of beef and pork
packers and poultry processors, which [some] assert increases the
market power and injustices the PSA was intended to prevent.”37 This
distinction forms a significant theoretical rift when discussing
GIPSA’s current rules.38
The year that Congress enacted the PSA, the Supreme Court
affirmed the constitutionality of the Act in Stafford v. Wallace.39 In
Stafford, the Court held that the Act was a valid exercise of Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause, as the activities falling within
the purview of the Act burdened the freedom of interstate
commerce and the stockyard business was an essential part of
interstate commerce.40 Thus, Stafford was the first indication of the
36. Shively & Roberts, supra note 33, at 431. Pieces of legislative history
bolstering this view were also discussed in Wheeler via the dissent. 591 F.3d at 378–79
(Garza, J., dissenting). The dissent quotes at length from H.R. No. 85-1048,
emphasizing the following language:
The primary purpose of this Act is to assure fair competition and fair
trade practices in livestock marketing and in the meatpacking
industry. The objective is to safeguard farmers and ranchers against
receiving less than the true market value of their livestock and to protect
consumers against unfair business practices in the marketing of meats,
poultry, etc. Protection is also provided to members of the livestock
marketing and meat industries from unfair, deceptive, unjustly
discriminatory, and monopolistic practices of competitors, large or small
....
The act provides that meatpackers subject to its provisions shall not
engage in practices that restrain commerce or create monopoly. They
are prohibited from buying or selling any article for the purpose of or
with the effect of manipulating or controlling prices in commerce. They
are also prohibited from engaging in any unfair, deceptive, or unjustly
discriminatory practice or device in the conduct of their business, or
conspiring, combining, agreeing, or arranging with other persons to do
any of these acts.
Id. at 378 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 85-1048 at 1–2).
37. Shively & Roberts, supra note 33, at 432.
38. See infra Part IV.
39. 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
40. Id. at 528 (“As already noted, the word ‘commerce,’ when used in the [A]ct,
is defined to be interstate and foreign commerce. Its provisions are carefully drawn
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PSA’s staying power and allowed enforcement of the Act to
commence.
B.

A General Overview of the PSA

The PSA provides a comprehensive approach to the meat and
poultry packing industry. The Act itself contains four subchapters: a
subchapter providing general definitions;41 a subchapter addressing
packers;42 a subchapter addressing stockyards and stockyard
dealers;43 and a subchapter addressing general and administrative
matters.44 The scope of the Act can be ascertained through the
definitions of the entities it covers: packers,45 stockyards,46 and
stockyard dealers.47 Although these terms’ definitions generally
pertain to “livestock,”48 various other specific provisions of the PSA
also regulate “poultry.”49
The Act imposes various types of obligations, some specific and
some general, on the above entities.50 For example, the Act
to apply only to those practices and obstructions which in the judgment of Congress
are likely to affect interstate commerce prejudicially. Thus construed and applied,
we think the [A]ct clearly within Congressional power and valid.”).
41. 7 U.S.C. §§ 181–83 (2012).
42. Id. §§ 191–98b.
43. Id. §§ 201–17a.
44. Id. §§ 221–29c.
45. Id. § 191 (“[A]ny person engaged in the business (a) of buying livestock in
commerce for purposes of slaughter, or (b) of manufacturing or preparing meats
or meat food products for sale or shipment in commerce, or (c) of marketing meats,
meat food products, or livestock products in an unmanufactured form acting as a
wholesale broker, dealer, or distributor in commerce.”).
46. Id. § 202(a) (“[A]ny place, establishment, or facility commonly known as
stockyards, conducted, operated, or managed for profit or nonprofit as a public
market for livestock producers, feeders, market agencies, and buyers, consisting of
pens, or other enclosures, and their appurtenances, in which live cattle, sheep,
swine, horses, mules, or goats are received, held, or kept for sale or shipment in
commerce.”).
47. Id. § 201(d) (“[A]ny person, not a market agency, engaged in the business
of buying or selling in commerce livestock, either on his own account or as the
employee or agent of the vendor or purchaser.”).
48. Id. § 182(4) (defining livestock as “cattle, sheep, swine, horses, mules, or
goats”).
49. Live poultry dealers are, for example, barred from engaging in unfair,
unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive practices. See id. § 192(a); see also id. § 182(6)
(defining poultry as “chickens, turkeys, ducks, geese, and other domestic fowl”).
50. For a detailed discussion of many of the obligations imposed by the Act (as
in effect in 2003), see Kelley, supra note 9, at 40–56.
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empowers the Secretary of Agriculture to require that packers be
bonded if their annual purchases exceed $500,000,51 imposes
statutory trusts on livestock and poultry (and meat derived
therefrom) purchased by packers,52 and requires prompt payments
from packers to protect livestock and poultry farmers and ranchers.53
Also, stockyards must furnish (and only furnish) “reasonable and
nondiscriminatory” services,54 charge reasonable rates for services,55
be managed in a way that insures a competitive market,56 keep
adequate accounts and records,57 and comply with the Secretary of
Agriculture’s orders.58
Despite the specific requirements discussed above, the core of
the PSA is a broad, general prohibition against unfair trade practices
by packers, stockyards, and dealers.59 Specifically, the Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any packer or swine contractor with
respect to livestock, meats, meat food products, or livestock
products in unmanufactured form, or for any live poultry
dealer with respect to live poultry, to:
(a) Engage in or use any unfair, unjustly
discriminatory, or deceptive practice or device; or
(b) Make or give any undue or unreasonable
preference or advantage to any particular person or
locality in any respect, or subject any particular person
or locality to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage in any respect . . . .60
A significant legal debate centers on the scope of the broad
prohibitions against “unfair” and “unjustly discriminatory” practices
and “undue or unreasonable preference[s]” in parts (a) and (b) of
this statute.61 Specifically, that debate centers on whether it is
necessary for claimants alleging a violation of section 192(a) or (b)
of the PSA to show proof of actual or likely harm to competition in
51. 7 U.S.C. § 204.
52. Id. § 196(b).
53. Id. § 228b(a).
54. Id. § 205.
55. Id. § 206.
56. Id. § 208(b).
57. Id. § 221.
58. Id. §§ 211–13.
59. Id. § 192.
60. Id.
61. See generally Shively & Roberts, supra note 33. Sections 192(a) and (b) have
remained “relatively unchanged” since the PSA was originally enacted. Id. at 424.
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the overall market rather than mere harm to the individual
claimant.62 Both sides of this debate acknowledge that the PSA does
not expressly address this issue.63 Those that oppose a competitive
harm requirement believe the absence of express language is
conclusive. On the other hand, others recognize the terms “unfair,”
“unjust,” and “undue or unreasonable” as legal terms of art in the
antitrust context that themselves require a showing of competitive
harm.64 But, as discussed more fully below, despite this ongoing
debate, the federal appellate courts that have faced this issue have
universally recognized a requirement of competitive harm (or likely
competitive harm) under sections 192(a) and 192(b) of the PSA.65
Many of the early cases applying the PSA come from the Seventh
Circuit, which was the home of many of the large packers that
motivated the enactment of the PSA. In 1939, the Seventh Circuit
considered an order of the Secretary of Agriculture prohibiting
preferential discounts to some (but not all) customers of a packer.66
In reversing this order, the Seventh Circuit held that the Secretary
was required to consider the effect of the disparate treatment on
competition before finding a violation of the PSA.67
Approximately twenty years later, the Seventh Circuit
considered an order of the Secretary of Agriculture arising from two
alleged violations of the PSA: (1) an agreement between a packer
and a competitive dealer to refrain from competitive bidding for topgrade hogs at a specific market and to share the hogs between them,
62. See Rachael L. Dettmann, Note, You’re Not the Boss of Me: An Analysis of
GIPSA’s Authority to Regulate Private Contracting in the Beef Industry, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC.
L. 321, 325 (2011).
63. See generally id.
64. Id. at 326–27.
65. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits have implemented the idea of competitive harm when analyzing claims
under section 192(a) or (b), and the Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
each held that a claimant cannot prevail under section 192(a) or (b) without
demonstrating competitive harm. See generally Terry v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 604 F.3d
272 (6th Cir. 2010); Wheeler v. Pilgrim’s Pride, 591 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2009); Been
v. O.K. Indus., Inc., 495 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2007); London v. Fieldale Farms Corp.,
410 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2005); Pickett v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 420 F.3d 1272
(11th Cir. 2005); IBP, Inc. v. Glickman, 187 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 1999); Philson v.
Goldsboro Milling Co., 164 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 1998); De Jong Packing Co. v. USDA,
618 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1980); Armor & Co. v. United States, 402 F.2d 712 (7th Cir.
1968).
66. Swift & Co. v. Wallace, 105 F.2d 848, 852 (7th Cir. 1939).
67. Id. at 854.
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and (2) a practice by the packer of quoting prices to dealers before
the dealers purchased hogs (and honoring the quoted price even if
the market changed in the interim).68 The court held that “the
agreement between competitive buyers to split or share the purchase
of top grade hogs” violated the PSA because “[t]he essential nature
and the necessary result of this arrangement or practice was to
eliminate competition.”69 On the other hand, the court held that the
mere “dissemination of price information to country dealers is not
illegal per se” under the PSA, but “is illegal only if made ‘for the
purpose of restricting or limiting competition, manipulating
livestock prices or controlling the movement of livestock.’”70
A few years later, in considering whether a packer’s short-term
coupon program for a particular type of bacon violated the PSA, the
Seventh Circuit reiterated its conclusion, based on the legislative
history of and case law interpreting the PSA, that a violation of
section 192(a) requires either “some predatory intent or some
likelihood of competitive injury.”71 As the court further expounded:
When viewed together, the antitrust laws, although not
completely harmonious and frequently overlapping,
express a basic public policy distinguishing between fair
and vigorous competition on the one hand and predatory
or controlled competition on the other. Normally the twin
solvents for determining when the boundaries of fair
competition have been exceeded are the existence of
predatory intent and the likelihood of injury to
competition. The clearer the danger of the latter, as when
competitors conspire to eliminate the uncertainties of
price competition, the less important is proof of the
former. Conversely, the likelihood of injury arising from
conduct adopted with predatory purpose is so great as to
require little or no showing that such injury has already
taken place. Each statutory prohibition of specified acts or
practices reflects the Congressional conclusions as to the
gravity of the injury to be feared and the relative difficulty
of distinguishing honest competition and predation. The
fact that a given provision does not expressly specify the
degree of injury or the type of intent required, does not
imply that these basic indicators of the line between free
68.
69.
70.
71.

Swift & Co. v. United States, 308 F.2d 849, 852–54 (7th Cir. 1962).
Id. at 853.
Id. at 854.
Armour & Co. v. United States, 402 F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1968).
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competition and predation are to be ignored. Surely words
such as “unfair” and “unjustly” in Section 202(a) and
“undue” and “unreasonable” in Section 202(b) require
some examination of the seller’s intent and the likely
effects of its acts or practices under scrutiny, even though
these tests under Section 202(a) and (b) be less stringent
than under some of the anti-trust laws. These adjectival
qualifications expressed in the statutory language enjoin
the Department and courts to apply a rule of reason in
determining the lawfulness of a particular practice under
Section 202(a) and (b).72
Other circuits have also consistently reached the same result. In
Farrow v. United States Department of Agriculture, for example, the
Eighth Circuit recognized that a practice is “unfair” under the PSA
“if it injures or is likely to injure competition.”73 Relying on “the
backdrop of corruption the [PSA] was intended to prevent” and “the
PSA’s antitrust ancestry,” the Eleventh Circuit joined several of its
sister circuits in 2005 and expressly held “that in order to prevail
under the PSA, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s deceptive
or unfair practice adversely affects competition or is likely to
adversely affect competition.”74 The Tenth Circuit joined this
growing group two years later and held that a violation of section
192(a) of the PSA requires proof “that the [challenged] practice
injures or is likely to injure competition.”75
The most thorough analysis of this issue, however, is in the Fifth
Circuit’s en banc decision in Wheeler v. Pilgrim’s Pride.76 In Wheeler, the
plaintiffs were chicken growers who alleged that the defendant gave
a non-party grower more preferable terms than those given to the
plaintiffs.77 The plaintiffs argued that this preferential treatment
constituted “‘deceptive, unlawful, unfair, capricious, arbitrary, and
discriminatory’ conduct in violation of § 192(a) and (b).”78 A
majority of the Fifth Circuit disagreed because the plaintiffs had not
demonstrated an “injury, or likelihood of injury, to competition”—a

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
760 F.2d 211, 214 (8th Cir. 1985).
Londale v. Fieldale Farms Corp., 410 F.3d 1295, 1302–05 (11th Cir. 2005).
Been v. O.K. Indus., Inc., 495 F.3d 1217, 1230 (10th Cir. 2007).
591 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
Id. at 357.
Id.
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necessity, according to the majority, for a claim brought under
section 192(a) or (b).79
In reaching this conclusion, the majority relied on several
justifications. First, the majority found that “[t]he anti-competitive
behaviors of the big meat packing companies of the 1920s motivated
Congress to pass the Act, and the Supreme Court in Stafford v. Wallace
concluded that the Act was constitutional because of the anticompetitive concerns of Congress.”80 Second, the majority found
that “[i]t [was] reasonable to conclude that Congress accepts the
meaning of § 192(a) to require an effect on competition to be
actionable because congressional silence in response to circuit
unanimity ‘after years of judicial interpretation supports adherence
to the traditional view.’”81 Finally, the majority noted that the
requirement of competitive harm promotes predictability.82
Requiring this showing of competitive harm under section 192(a) or
(b) is predictable, given judicial precedent requiring the same.83 A
significant concurring opinion, joined by several of the judges in the
majority, further clarified that the requirement of competitive harm
is consistent with the plain language of the statute.84 The
concurrence reasoned that key statutory terms had become legal
terms of art with clear, recognized meanings, which included
competitive harm, by the time the PSA was enacted.85
Several Fifth Circuit judges dissented, concluding that a claim
brought under section 192(a) or (b) should not require a showing
of competitive harm.86 The dissent focused mainly on the language
of section 192 as a whole, stating:
The plain language of the PSA, however, is clear. Some
subsections contain “restraining commerce” language
[subsections 192(c), (d), and (e)] and some do not
[subsections 192(a) and 192(b)]. We have to give effect to
79. Id. at 363.
80. Id. at 362.
81. Id. at 361–62 (quoting General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S.
581, 593–94 (2004)). The majority noted that “after 1921 and up to 2002, Congress
has amended § 192 seven times without making any changes that would affect the
many court interpretations” imposing a competitive harm requirement,
notwithstanding judicial history requiring a showing of competitive harm. Id. at 361.
82. Id. at 363.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 364–71 (Jones, J. concurring).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 372 (Garza, J., dissenting).

358

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:2

this difference. . . . The most natural reading is that those
subsections with the “restraining commerce” language
require a competitive injury and those without it do not.
Because the majority’s construction of the PSA avoids this
straightforward conclusion only by reading absent terms
into the statute, it should be rejected.87
In sum, the trend in favor of requiring a showing of competitive
harm as an element of section 192(a) or (b) is strong, despite
advocacy of arguments to the contrary. There is little indication at
this point that the trend will cease within the judiciary without
further action by other governmental entities.
III. EXPANSION OF THE PSA THROUGH THE 2008 FARM BILL
One of the ways in which the PSA has been amended or
impacted is through the passage of “farm bills.” The term “farm bill”
refers to an omnibus bill concerning a wide variety of topics,
including agriculture, conservation, and food assistance.88 The first
farm bill, titled the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1933, was passed
to combat the effects of the Great Depression.89 The Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933 set the stage for similar legislation, which is
still drafted and enacted periodically today; the most recent farm bill
was passed three years ago and is entitled the Agricultural Act of
2014.90
Since the adoption of the PSA and the enactment of the first
farm bill, livestock and poultry farming has undergone significant
economic changes. Specifically, consolidation has produced larger
farming operations that are owned by fewer farmers.91 Many of these
larger operations (particularly in swine and poultry) have vertically
integrated their operations.92 They now use contract-grower
87. Id. at 377.
88. A Short History and Summary of the Farm Bill, FARM POLICY FACTS,
https://www.farmpolicyfacts.org/farm-policy-history/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
89. Id.
90. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649. For
a full list of, and links to, farm bills enacted since 1933, see United States Farm Bills,
NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR., http://nationalaglawcenter.org/farmbills/ (last visited Feb.
22, 2017).
91. JAMES M. MACDONALD ET AL., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
ERR-152, FARM SIZE AND THE ORGANIZATION OF U.S. CROP FARMING 15 (Aug. 2013),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/45108/39359_err152.pdf.
92. CLEMENT E. WARD, VERTICAL INTEGRATION COMPARISON: BEEF, PORK, AND
POULTRY (1997).
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agreements under which smaller farmers contract to provide the
facilities and labor to care for animals that are owned (and eventually
marketed) by the larger integrator.93 Although these larger,
integrated farming operations have been decried by some as
“corporate farming,” these arrangements can provide significant
benefits to the contract growers by providing consistent, guaranteed
income that is not dependent on highly volatile market prices or
significant disease risks.94 These practices also benefit consumers
because they ensure consistent supply and quality of meat products
and reduce prices through improved efficiency.95
The farm bill passed in 2008, which is over five hundred pages
in length and entitled the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act (the
“2008 Farm Bill” or the “Bill”), made various modifications to the
PSA.96 In particular, the 2008 Farm Bill added new provisions that
regulated the contractual relationships between larger, integrated
farmers and contract growers in swine and poultry.97 This
development is a marked expansion of the historical scope of the
PSA, which had never before regulated the economic activities of
farmers; it had regulated only packers, stockyards, and dealers.98 The
2008 Farm Bill also directed the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) to adopt regulations on certain specific topics.99
These changes are more fully discussed below.

93. Id.
94. Phillip L. Kunkel & Jeffrey A. Peterson, Agricultural Production Contracts, U.
MINN. EXTENSION 1, 1–2 (June 2015), https://www.extension.umn.edu/agriculture
/business/taxation/farm-legal-series/agricultural-production-contracts/docs
/agricultural-production-contracts.pdf (“Such contracts may provide for a more
stable income for the producer by reducing traditional marketing risks. . . . An
agricultural production contract may provide the producer with a guaranteed
market . . . .”).
95. Nathan Wittmaack, Should Corporate Farming Be Limited in the United States?:
An Economic Perspective, 8 MAJOR THEMES ECON. 45, 54 (2006) (discussing how the
“corporate farming” style creates efficiency gains that are passed on to the
consumer).
96. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, 122 Stat.
923.
97. Id. § 208 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 197a (2012)).
98. See generally Kelley, supra note 9 (describing what the PSA regulated prior
to the 2008 Farm Bill).
99. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act § 11006.
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An Increase in Benefits to Growers and Producers

Section 11005 of the 2008 Farm Bill added sections 197a, 197b,
and 197c to the PSA, which deal with production contracts, choice
of law and venue, and arbitration, respectively.100 Each of these new
provisions increases (or, at least, attempts to increase) the benefits
or protections afforded to contract growers.101
First, the 2008 Farm Bill granted poultry growers and swine
production contract growers the right to cancel a growing or
production contract within three business days of the contract’s
execution or by a contractually specified cancellation date.102 The
contract itself must “clearly disclose” these cancellation rights, as well
as the method of cancellation.103 The contract must also
“conspicuously state,” on the contract’s first page, that “additional
large capital investments may be required of the poultry grower or
swine production contract grower during the term of the poultry
growing arrangement or swine production contract,” if such
investments may, in fact, be required.104
Second, with regard to choice-of-law and venue,105 the 2008
Farm Bill mandated that the proper forum in which a contract
dispute between the parties to a poultry growing arrangement or
swine production or marketing contract is the federal judicial district
in which principle performance is set to take place.106 Additionally,
the Bill allows the contract to specify which state’s law applies in a

100. Id. § 11005.
101. See id.
102. See 7 U.S.C. § 197a(a)(1) (2012).
103. Id. § 197a(a)(2).
104. Id. § 197a(b)(1).
105. For a discussion of choice-of-law provisions generally and the enforceability
of choice-of-law provisions in the arbitration context specifically, see Ross Ball, FAA
Preemption by Choice-of-Law Provisions: Enforceable or Unenforceable?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL.
613, 613 (2006) (“Generally, choice-of-law provisions allow corporations that do
business in several states or countries to draft their agreements and conduct their
business in accordance with the law they choose. When the choice-of-law provision
is contained in a contract that does not have an agreement to arbitrate, courts
generally have no qualms about enforcing them. However, when the contract does
contain an agreement to arbitrate, courts are reluctant to enforce the choice-of-law
provision as to the arbitration agreement because the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
governs arbitration agreements.”).
106. 7 U.S.C. § 197b(a).
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contract dispute, unless prohibited by the law of the state in which
the principal part of the performance under the contract occurs.107
Third and finally, with regard to arbitration, the 2008 Farm Bill
granted producers and growers the right—to be exercised prior to
entering the contract—to decline to be bound by a contractual
provision requiring arbitration, should such a provision be present
in a livestock or poultry contract.108 The Bill also required that such
contracts conspicuously disclose the right to decline arbitration109
and allowed a producer or grower to elect the use of arbitration,
even if the producer or grower declined such use at the time the
contract was formed.110
While a review of the 2008 Farm Bill’s enactment does not
appear to reveal great amounts of controversy regarding these
additions,111 the debate surrounding, and the rejection of, other
proposed Bill amendments demonstrate that sweeping reform to the
PSA was not intended. For example, Tester amendment No. 3666
would have expanded the scope of the PSA by preventing a packer
from defending an unfair purchasing practices lawsuit on the
grounds that its actions were based on a justified business decision.112
Additionally, Grassley amendment No. 3823 would have created an
Agricultural Competition task force to study problems in agricultural
competition and generally increase oversight over agricultural
mergers, transactions, and competition issues.113
107. Id. § 197b(b).
108. Id. § 197c(a).
109. Id. § 197c(b).
110. Id. § 197c(c).
111. See 154 CONG. REC. 3801, 3811 (2008) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte)
(“[T]his bill is bipartisan because we worked together to give on both sides to make
sure that we came up with a good farm bill that could command strong bipartisan
support.”).
112. See 153 CONG. REC. 14406-01 (2007); see also 153 CONG. REC. 15390-01
(2007) (statement of Sen. Roberts) (In opposition to the amendment: “This
amendment will result in all producers being treated the same . . . regardless of how
efficient or inefficient their operation may be and regardless of the quality of
product they produce.”); id. (statement of Sen. Burr) (“I hope my colleagues here
understand that the law, as currently written, works. It has served this country well
and it has produced choice, it has produced quality, and it has fairly reimbursed all
who entered into it. Let’s not change it, and let’s make sure the products that
America has chosen and continues to choose in the marketplace are driven by the
marketplace, not manipulated by this body in Washington.”).
113. 153 CONG. REC. 15078-02 (2007); 153 CONG. REC. 15433-01 (2007)
(statement of Sen. Grassley) (discussing proposed amendment 3823); id. (statement
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In sum, the 2008 Farm Bill made some small adjustments to the
PSA, but the non-severity of these adjustments—along with the
rejection of some more severe amendments—demonstrates that the
Bill was not intended to bring sweeping reform to the Act or the way
in which it was administered.
B.

The Administrative Rules Produced as a Result of the 2008 Farm Bill

In addition to the amendments it made to the PSA itself, the
2008 Farm Bill instructed USDA to promulgate specific rules to aid
in the Act’s implementation.114 This Section discusses those
instructions and USDA’s response thereto.
1.

The 2008 Farm Bill’s Narrow Direction to USDA

Section 11006 of the 2008 Farm Bill directed the Secretary of
Agriculture to promulgate rules,115 no later than two years
subsequent to the passage of the Bill, establishing criteria for the
Secretary to use in determining:
(1) whether an undue or unreasonable preference or
advantage has occurred in violation of such Act;
(2) whether a live poultry dealer has provided
reasonable notice to poultry growers of any suspension of
the delivery of birds under a poultry growing arrangement;
(3) when a requirement of additional capital
investments over the life of a poultry growing arrangement
of Sen. Brownback) (In opposition to amendment 3823: “I believe the route to go
is what we have been doing in the Packers and Stockyards Administration and
having industry standards that are similar across all industries, and that we should
support the Packers and Stockyards Administration, support the laws that are there,
fund those entities—which I support doing—maintaining those standards but
allowing these innovative approaches to take place for a major industry in my State
and for my producers and cattle producers across the country.”).
114. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, § 11006,
122 Stat. 923, 1358.
115. The promulgation of administrative rules is a common occurrence in
which an executive agency writes and enacts rules pursuant to a congressional grant
of rulemaking power. Informal, or “notice-and-comment,” rulemaking (which was
utilized by USDA in the rulemakings noted in this article) requires publication of a
notice of proposed rulemaking, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), a period of time in which
interested persons may provide comments on the proposed rule, § 553(c), and
publication of the final rule not less than 30 days prior to its effective date, § 553(c).
The informal rulemaking process does not include a hearing requirement. See
generally United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
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or swine production contract constitutes a violation of such
Act; and
(4) if a live poultry dealer or swine contractor has
provided a reasonable period of time for a poultry grower
or a swine production contract grower to remedy a breach
of contract that could lead to termination of the poultry
growing arrangement or swine production contract.116
The Bill, via enactment of 7 U.S.C. § 197c, also directed the
Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations related to the
PSA’s newly codified provisions governing arbitration.117
2.

GIPSA’s Rulemaking Process in Response to the 2008 Farm Bill

On June 22, 2010, GIPSA, acting on behalf of the Secretary of
Agriculture, published its proposed rules in the Federal Register and
provided that GIPSA would consider comments received by August
23, 2010.118 To the surprise of many, the proposed rules were
expansive. For example, the proposed rules would attempt to
reverse, by administrative fiat, decades of federal judicial precedent
by eliminating the need for a claimant under 7 U.S.C. § 192(a) or
(b) to demonstrate a competitive injury.119 The proposed rules also
sought to impose capital investment recoupment requirements in
grower contracts, modify the grower payment system, require
vigorous recordkeeping requirements, and require disclosure and
online publication of sample contracts.120 An analysis prepared for
the National Pork Producers Association determined that the
proposed regulations “would have limited farmers’ ability to sell
animals, dictated the terms of private contracts, made it harder to
get farm financing, raised consumer prices and reduced choices,
stifled industry innovation,”121 and “cost the pork industry more than
$330 million annually.”122
116. § 11006, 122 Stat. at 1358.
117. 7 U.S.C. § 197c(f) (2012); see supra Section III.A.
118. Implementation of Regulations Required Under Title XI of the Food,
Conservation and Energy Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,338 (proposed June 22,
2010).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. NAT’L PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL, For the Week Ending April 22, 2016 (Apr.
22, 2016), http://nppc.org/for-the-week-ending-april-22-2016/.
122. ‘GIPSA’ Rule Would Wipe Out TPP Benefits, Says NPPC, NAT’L PORK PRODUCERS
COUNCIL (May 26, 2016), nppc.org/gipsa-rule-would-wipe-out-tpp-benefits-says
-nppc/.
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GIPSA’s proposed rules were discussed extensively in a July 20,
2010, hearing before the House of Representatives Subcommittee
on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry.123 The general tone of the hearing
was, mildly put, critical of GIPSA’s proposed rules.124 First, as a
procedural matter, the Subcommittee was critical that GIPSA only
provided a sixty-day comment period with regard to the proposed
rules, as opposed to a longer comment period.125 Second, the
Subcommittee expressed its opposition, as a matter of substance, to
various items within the proposed rule, including the elimination of
a need to demonstrate competitive harm under 7 U.S.C. § 192(a) or
(b);126 the ban on packer-to-packer sales;127 the classification of a
packer paying a premium or applying a discount on the purchase
price received by a producer without substantiation as an unfair,
unjust, discriminatory, or deceptive practice;128 and the requirement
that grower contracts be for a duration that provides the producer
with an opportunity to recoup up to eighty percent of his or her
investment.129 The Subcommittee also expressed its displeasure that
“[a] number of [the proposed GIPSA] provisions had previously
been rejected . . . in the Senate process, and certainly in the [2008]

123. Hearing to Review Livestock and Related Programs at USDA in Advance of the 2012
Farm Bill: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry of the H. Comm.
Agric., 111th Cong. 2 (2010).
124. Id. at 3 (statement of Hon. David Scott, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on
Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry) (“This proposed rule goes well beyond—well
beyond—what Congress intended.”).
125. Id. (“You are given only 60 days for review and comment, which is clearly
an inadequate amount of time. These are the most sweeping changes to the Packers
and Stockyards Act in nearly 100 years, and GIPSA did little or nothing to get the
input from the livestock and poultry industry.”).
126. Id. at 46–47 (statement of Rep. David P. Roe, Member, H. Subcomm. on
Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry).
127. Id. at 36–37, 40–41, 44–46 (statement of Rep. Jim Costa, Member, H.
Subcomm. on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry; statement of Rep. K. Michael Conaway,
Member, H. Subcomm. on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry; statement of Rep. Walt
Minnick, Member, H. Subcomm. on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry; statement of Rep.
David P. Roe, Member, H. Subcomm. on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry).
128. Id. at 54–55 (statement of Rep. Jim Costa, Member, H. Subcomm. on
Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry).
129. Id. at 56–57.
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farm bill.”130 The meeting resulted in an understanding that the
GIPSA rules were in need of closer scrutiny.131
On December 9, 2011, after receiving more than 61,000
comments in response to the proposed rules, GIPSA published its
final rules in the Federal Register.132 The final rules, which
dramatically cut back on the proposed rules, only governed the
general subjects of reasonable notice in the case of bird delivery
suspension, contract requirements for additional capital
investments, determining what constitutes a reasonable amount of
time for remedying a breach of contract, and arbitration.133 Thus,
the final rules, which went into effect February 7, 2012,134 addressed
four of the five congressional directives in the Farm Bill.135
3.

The GIPSA Riders and the Newest GIPSA Rules

One of the reasons that some of the proposed GIPSA rules were
not finalized in 2011, and remained that way, is that they were
blocked by so-called “GIPSA riders,” which refer to provisions
attached to annual agricultural funding bills that prevent finalization
of the more controversial GIPSA rules.136 The first GIPSA rider was
imposed shortly before USDA finalized the GIPSA rules via passage
of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act—

130. Id. at 1 (statement of Hon. David Scott, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on
Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry).
131. See id. at 54 (discussion between Rep. Jim Costa, Member, H. Subcomm. on
Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry and Hon. Edward M. Avalos, Under Secretary, for
Marketing and Regulatory Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Agric.). Costa stated to Avalos,
“Mr. Under Secretary, when you . . . go back to the shop at the USDA this afternoon,
and if the Secretary happens to call you or look into your office and say, ‘How did
it go, the hearing this afternoon,’ what would be your response?” Avalos replied,
“Congressman, that is an easy answer. I would say, ‘Mr. Secretary, it was a
tremendous lesson for me. Mr. Secretary, we need to continue and encourage
comments and input on the proposed GIPSA rule.’” Id.
132. Implementation of Regulations Required Under Title XI of the Food,
Conservation and Energy Act of 2008; Suspension of Delivery of Birds, Additional
Capital Investment Criteria, Breach of Contract, and Arbitration, 76 Fed. Reg.
76,874, 76,876 (Dec. 9, 2011) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 201).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See supra Section III.B.1.
136. See generally GREENE, supra note 12 (discussing the rulemaking history of
GIPSA’s proposed rules and how subsequent GIPSA riders prevented enactment of
certain aspects of those proposed rules).
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the agricultural funding bill for fiscal year 2012.137 Similar GIPSA
riders were imposed for fiscal years 2013,138 2014,139 and 2015.140
However, there was no GIPSA rider attached to fiscal year 2016’s
agricultural funding bill, thus leaving the door open for USDA to
once again push the GIPSA rules proposed and rejected in 2010.141
The USDA began walking through this open door in March
2016 when the USDA Secretary, Thomas Vilsack, announced that the
proposed GIPSA rules were being worked on and that USDA
intended to move forward with certain elements of that proposal.142
In October, 2016, new proposed rules were sent to the White House
for review, and on December 20, 2016, GIPSA published proposed
rules and one interim final rule in the Federal Register.143
The interim final rule sets the groundwork for GIPSA’s newest
rules and states:
A finding that the challenged conduct or action adversely
affects or is likely to adversely affect competition is not
necessary in all cases [brought pursuant to sections 192(a)
and/or (b) of the Act]. Certain conduct or action can be
found to violate sections [192](a) and/or (b) of the Act
without a finding of harm or likely harm to competition.144
This language is ambiguous in that it does not explicate the
types of conduct or action that could violate sections 192(a) and/or
(b) of the PSA without a finding of competitive harm, and GIPSA
purports to resolve this ambiguity through the proposed rules.
The first part of the proposed rules (section 201.210) is
structured as three paragraphs: paragraph (a) states that any
conduct or action that the PSA explicitly deems to be “unfair,”
“unjustly discriminatory,” or “deceptive” per se violates section

137. See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub.
L. No. 112-55, 125 Stat. 552 (2011); GREENE, supra note 12, at 32.
138. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L.
No. 113-6, 127 Stat. 198; GREENE, supra note 12, at 32.
139. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 128 Stat. 5;
GREENE, supra note 12, at 33.
140. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L.
No. 113-235, 128 Stat. 2130 (2014); GREENE, supra note 12, at 34;
141. GIPSA Rule, NAT’L PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL, http://nppc.org/wp-content
/uploads/2016/06/GIPSARule-003.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
142. See id.
143. Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration, 81 Fed. Reg.
92,566–94, 92,703–40 (Dec. 20, 2016) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 201).
144. Id. at 92,594.

2017]

AN EXPANSIVE LEAP: GIPSA’S ATTEMPT

367

192(a) of the Act;145 paragraph (b) provides a list of nine examples146
of conduct or action that, absent demonstration of a legitimate
business justification, violate section 192(a) of the Act, whether or
not there is a showing of competitive harm; and paragraph (c) states
that “any conduct or action that harms or is likely to harm
competition” violates section 192(a) of the Act.147 The second part
of the proposed rules (section 201.214) would add a tenth example
to section 201.210(b) by amendment: failure to “use a poultry
grower ranking system in a fair manner after applying” four specific
criteria.148 The final part of the proposed rules (section 201.211) lists
criteria that will be considered when determining whether there has
been a violation of section 192(b) of the PSA.149 The last of these
criteria is “[w]hether the conduct or action by a packer, swine
contractor, or live poultry dealer harms or is likely to harm
competition.”150
145. Id. at 92,722.
146. These examples are: (1) retaliatory actions or threats of action “in response
to lawful communication, association, or assertion of rights” by a producer or
grower; (2) “conduct or action that limits or attempts to limit . . . the legal rights
and remedies” of a producer or grower (e.g., the right to seek an award of attorney
fees); (3) failure to comply with the requirements of 9 C.F.R. § 201.100 (dealing
with records to be furnished to poultry growers and sellers); (4) failure to “provide
reasonable notice to a poultry grower before suspending the delivery of birds, after
applying” 9 C.F.R. § 201.215; (5) “requiring unreasonable additional capital
investments from a poultry grower or swine production contract grower after
applying” 9 C.F.R. § 201.216; (6) failure to “provide a reasonable period of time to
remedy a breach of contract,” after applying 9 C.F.R. § 201.217; (7) failure to
“provide a meaningful opportunity to participate” in arbitration, after applying 9
C.F.R. § 201.218; (8) failure to “ensure accurate scales and weighing”; and (9)
failure to “ensure the accuracy of . . . electronic evaluation systems and devices . . . .”
Id. at 92,722–23.
147. Id. at 92,723.
148. Id. at 92,740. These four specific criteria are: (1) whether sufficient
information has been provided to a grower in order to make informed decisions;
(2) whether “inputs of comparable quality and quantity” are provided to all growers
in a tournament ranking group; (3) whether “growers provided with dissimilar
production variables” are included in a tournament ranking group in a manner that
affects the grower’s compensation; and (4) whether the “dealer has demonstrated
a legitimate business justification for use of a [tournament system] that may
otherwise be unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive or [give] an undue or
unreasonable preference or advantage . . . .” Id.
149. Id. at 92,723.
150. Id. The other criteria set forth in § 201.211 are: (1) whether one or more
producers or growers are treated more favorably than other similarly situated
producers or growers “who have engaged in lawful communication, association, or
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After a brief extension by the Trump administration, the
comment period for the proposed rules closed on March 24, 2017.151
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, GIPSA must now publish a
final rule in order for the proposed rules to become effective.152 The
interim final rule, on the other hand, is scheduled to take effect on
April 22, 2017, but its ultimate effectiveness appears to be uncertain
at present.153
IV. THE LEGAL ARGUMENT: WHY GIPSA’S NEWEST RULES ARE
WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION
The preceding narrative sets up what is really at the heart of this
article—that GIPSA’s newest rules are seriously flawed from at least
three angles. Specifically, GIPSA’s rules are out of sync with the
purpose of the PSA, the meat packing industry in light of the PSA’s
purpose, and the federal judiciary and legislature.
First, GIPSA’s newest rules are contrary to the purpose of the
PSA because the PSA is, and was always meant to be, an antitrust
statute. As discussed above, the PSA was enacted in response to
specific conditions in the meat packing industry 100 years ago.154
Specifically, a small number of packers controlled the market and
utilized a number of anticompetitive and monopolistic practices to
reduce prices paid to livestock producers and increase market prices
assertion of their rights”; (2) whether one or more producers or growers are treated
more favorably than other similarly situated producers or growers who are alleged,
without a reasonable basis, to have violated any applicable law, rule, or regulation;
(3) whether one or more producers or growers are treated more favorably than
other similarly situated producers or growers “for an arbitrary reason unrelated to
the livestock or poultry operation”; (4) whether one or more producers or growers
are treated more favorably than other similarly situated producers or growers “on
the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, disability, political beliefs,
sexual orientation, or marital or family status”; and (5) “[w]hether the packer, . . .
contractor, or . . . dealer has demonstrated a legitimate business justification for
conduct or action that may otherwise constitute an undue or unreasonable
preference or advantage.” Id.
151. Poultry Grower Ranking Systems, 82 Fed. Reg. 9533–34 (Feb. 7, 2017).
152. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
153. GIPSA has stated that it may alter the interim final rule based on comments
it received thereon, 81 Fed. Reg. 92,570–71; 82 Fed. Reg. 9489 (Feb. 7, 2017), and
many industry groups are currently advocating that the interim final rule be
abandoned altogether. NPPC Asks USDA to Abandon GIPSA Rules, NAT’L PORK
PRODUCERS COUNCIL (Mar. 24, 2017), http://nppc.org/nppc-asks-usda-to-abandon
-gipsa-rules/.
154. See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.
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paid by consumers.155 The PSA was enacted to adapt the existing
antitrust principals, as reflected in other statutes, to the unique
practices in the livestock farming and meat packing industry.156
Second, GIPSA’s newest rules are discordant with the meat
packing industry in light of the PSA’s purpose. The PSA is an
antitrust statute; thus, its general purpose is to regulate specific
industry sectors in order to prevent monopolization within those
sectors, which in turn benefits other industry players and
consumers.157 However, monopolization cannot occur where
barriers to entry are absent or negligible. Historically, the sector of
the meat industry most susceptible to monopolization is meat
packing.158 This industry requires large capital investments in
facilities and equipment, a large source of available labor, and access
to significant transportation infrastructure in order to efficiently
operate.159 These needs pose a significant barrier to entry into this
industry and thus make the meat packing industry susceptible to
monopoly or oligopoly, as demonstrated by the history of such
conditions within the industry.
In contrast, monopolization is unlikely to occur at the grower
level—the sector of the meat industry that GIPSA’s newest rules
focus on—because the grower industry lacks significant barriers to
entry. In comparison to the meat packing industry, the necessary
investment and labor to operate a livestock barn is comparatively
small. Thus, it is paradoxical to suggest that the PSA—an antitrust
statute—is a proper avenue for regulation with regard to growers.
Third and finally, GIPSA’s newest rules are incongruous with
both the judicial and legislative branches of the federal government.
The jurisprudential landscape surrounding the PSA has
unwaveringly required a showing of competitive harm in order to
demonstrate a violation of the Act’s ban on unfair or deceptive
practices imposed by 7 U.S.C. § 192.160 In conjunction, the legislative
history associated with the PSA’s ban on unfair or deceptive practices
demonstrates Congress’s acquiescence and silent approval of section

155. See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text.
157. 7 U.S.C. § 192 (2012); see supra Section II.B; supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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192’s competitive harm requirement.161 For GIPSA—a facet of the
executive branch—to now attempt to exercise its rulemaking
authority to circumnavigate these actions for purposes of pursuing
its own policy agendas cuts against the fundamental notions
embraced by America’s longstanding separation-of-powers
principles. After all:
The regular distribution of power into distinct
departments; the introduction of legislative balances and
checks; the institution of courts composed of judges
holding their offices during good behavior; the
representation of the people in the legislature by deputies
of their own election . . . . They are means, and powerful
means, by which the excellences of republican government
may be retained and its imperfections lessened or
avoided.162
In sum, GIPSA’s newest rules would completely sever the PSA
from its antitrust roots and would instead transform the statute into
an expansive, unlimited regulation by the federal government of
routine commercial practices within the livestock industry. If
approved, any breach of a contract in the livestock industry would be
subject to potential regulation by the federal government. These
issues, however, have historically been (and properly remain) the
province of state law. Thus, the newest rules represent an unjustified
and improper attempt by GIPSA to dramatically increase the scope
of its regulatory power.
V. CONCLUSION
Like a myriad of other industries, the meat packing industry has
changed with the times. What was once a disjunctive landscape of
scattered growers and omnipotent packers is now a large,
interconnected, and sophisticated system. However, one thing that
has not changed throughout this paradigmatic shift is the PSA. At its
start, the PSA was an antitrust statute, carefully crafted in light of its
goal to foster competition. Throughout its life, the PSA has retained
this purpose, despite numerous arguments raised to the contrary.
Only time will tell whether GIPSA’s newest rules manage to alter
the well-established landscape of the PSA. Undoubtedly, that period
of time will be riddled with legal arguments, which may mirror those
161.
162.

See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 49 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898).
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asserted by this article or raise entirely new arguments altogether.
Above all else, however, one can only hope that the ultimate result
serves to foster, rather than impede, the meat industry, which is
surely one of the most important sectors in both the United States’
economy and society.
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